

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy

JANUARY, 1929

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An Editorial

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THE PROBLEM OF VISUAL SPACE

JAMES A. MCWILLIAMS

Professor of Cosmology, St. Louis University

A LARGE number of philosophical writers are troubled over the visual appearance of certain objects. Locke tried to get away from the difficulty by dividing properties into primary and secondary. The primary are, roughly, those that have to do with quantity, the secondary with qualities. The primary he conceded to be extramentally real, the secondary he took to be entirely mental. Philosophical scientists immediately pounced upon the primary properties as the only ones they need bother about; here they had mass, motion, extent,—everything required for measuring and numbering,—and with these they were content.

It now develops that even primaries have their difficulties. In this brief article I wish to speak of spacial properties only, and discuss them from the standpoint of vision. By visual space we do not understand space as a receptacle, but simply as extension; nor do we understand extension in the abstract, but in the concrete. Space thus understood is a primary property. Our subject, therefore, is sight perception of extended bodies.

The first difficulty is presented by objects seen in a mirror. They are not where we see them. Professor Whitehead calls these objects "delusive." Passing over this

strange choice of a name, we need only remark that the professor, in common with many others, seems to consider distance an essential and primal datum of vision; whereas it is quite patent that the impression of distance is acquired. It is beyond dispute that infants, as well as adults, cured of congenital blindness, do not know in the first moments of vision which objects are nearer, which farther away. In fact, an infant can hardly know near and far at all. Without going deeply into the origin of our perception of distance, it is safe to say that we get our first impression of it by moving,—both by moving the limbs and by moving about among objects. Once the notion of distance is obtained, we learn to gauge the shorter distances from muscular sensations caused by converging and focusing the eyes upon an object. For greater distances other factors must enter.

Sight of itself reports relative size. Without the aid of any other sense a toy balloon looks larger when blown up, and smaller when the air is allowed to escape. But the same impression can be produced by simply moving the balloon toward or away from the eyes. The child cannot tell whether the balloon is being moved until it learns that objects look dimmer as the distance increases. Thus relative size plus relative clarity are, for remote objects, the factors which give through sight the impression of distance.

The difficulty is that all this has become so much of an acquired habit before we reach adult life that we have forgotten the process of its acquisition.

The habit has become so inveterate with us that distance seems a primal datum of sight perception. Thus in the case of a picture, if the artist has made proper use of converging lines and of light and shadow, we are simply unable to see the objects in the one plane of the canvas where they really are. Since such is our constant experience, we should not wonder at objects in a mirror. A mirror is nothing more than a superior picture. There is no more mystery about it than about an ordinary painting, or photograph, or projection on a screen.

The next difficulty is afforded by a problem much discussed by G. E. Moore, Laird, Alexander, Russell, and other English Neo-Realists. There is a round table, say, in the center of a room. The top of the table, as you look at it, is elliptical. To confirm this fact, a camera will record an elliptical figure on the plate. Nevertheless, we see the table not as elliptical but as round. There is a further complication. As you walk about the table, the major axis of the ellipse shifts. To common sense, these facts do not constitute a difficulty, but to the "philosophers of common sense" they do.

It must be granted that if we were limited to the one sense of sight for our perception of size and shape, we would certainly be in a bad way to solve our difficulty. But let us consider the genesis of our perception of shape. A child is given a silver dollar. Without looking, the child's hand tells it the size and shape of the object. When it looks, its hand can partly conceal the dollar from sight, wholly conceal it, gradually reveal it again—the tactile sensations being reported in exact accord with the visual ones. This correspondence of sight and touch teaches the child that it sees the same object which it feels.¹ The child now turns the coin at an angle. The dollar, without altering its size or shape (for feeling reports these unaltered), changes its look. Visually the outline is elliptical. But the child soon learns, from the play of light, how a circular object looks at an angle; and after a while forgets that it ever got the impression of an ellipse. We have all had similar experiences; and that is why we see the table as round. It is also the reason why an artist, depicting two figures with exactly the same measurements on his canvas, can make the one appear as the top of a round table and the other as an elliptical design on a wall.

But the true difficulty of our Neo-Realists is: How can the perceptions of a dozen observers around an actual table be so different and still be objective? That difficulty comes from a failure to acknowledge frankly the distinction between accident and substance. Such failure is in turn due to that confusion of sense and intelligence which creates most of our problems of knowledge. Brutes, with only one kind of knowledge, have no such problems; nor, I take it, do the angels have any. But sense and intelligence play fast and loose with us poor humans and make us a puzzle to ourselves. A helpful remedy, I believe, would be to study the genesis of our common impressions

and our ready inferences. Or, to put it another way, if by some miracle of precocity we had begun to read philosophy before we were able to walk, and while the processes of learning were still fresh in our minds, we could have beguiled the tedium of our cradles with many a hearty laugh at the troubles of our learned elders.

The Milwaukee Convention

REV. JOHN F. MCCORMICK, S. J., head of the philosophy department of Marquette University, was elected president of the American Catholic Philosophical Association at the fourth annual meeting held December 27th and 28th at Marquette University. Fr. McCormick is the author of *Scholastic Metaphysics*, and is a contributor to THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN.

An unusually large crowd of visitors and delegates attended the sessions in the Science Building of the University. Perhaps the most noteworthy of the papers read was that of Rev. Francis Augustine Walsh of St. Anselm's Priory, Washington, D. C., on *Trends in American Thought*.

Fr. Walsh was quite sanguine about the status of philosophy in this country. Among the hopeful signs he mentioned the now definite abandonment of 19th Century materialism, a broader view of metaphysics, pronounced "seriousness" of investigation, and an earnest effort to construct philosophy on the data of science.

His criticism of the new trends and systems was terse and convincing. Academic philosophy, he said, was drifting towards "unintelligible nominalism, hypostatizing abstractions, vague spiritual mysticism, and abolition of mind." This is manifested in four attitudes: emergent evolution, from biology; behaviorism, from psychology; relativity and metaphysics drawn from it, based on physics, chemistry and mathematics; and the New Realism of Durrant Drake.

It was Fr. Walsh's opinion that these attitudes fall short in several important ways. They do not accept the necessary character of knowledge, and fail to assign to mind its proper place as a tool in science; they neglect the necessary attributes of ultimates and of First Cause; they are under the influence of a determinism which is almost mechanical.

The papers of the first day of the convention were on ethics. Those who took part in the symposium were Revs. Charles C. Miltner, C. S. C., Virgil Michel, O. S. B., Gerald B. Phelan, and Paul Hanly Furfey. The morning session of the next day was given over to a consideration of the teaching of philosophy, with a paper by Rev. J. Vincent Kelly, S. J., on *The Teaching of Philosophy in the College*, which provoked a warm discussion, and Rev. Jules A. Baisnée's. *The Method of Teaching Philosophy in the Seminary*. Fr. Walsh presented the only paper on the afternoon program.

Besides Fr. McCormick the following officers were elected: Rev. Fulton J. Sheen, secretary-treasurer, Msgr. James H. Ryan, vice-president, Gerald B. Phelan and William F. Roemer, members of the Executive Council.

(1) Controverting Berkeley; cf. *New Theory of Vision*, 49 sq.

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Thoughts On A Lost Art

CONVERSATION has frequently been termed a lost art. Many are the writers who have bewailed the far cry from the sprightly give and take of the ancient symposium or the wide range of subjects of the Victorian drawing room to the stereotyped phrases and the conventional discussion on the weather of the present day. Such comparisons smack of the characteristic fallacy of the *laudator temporis acti*—the best of one age is contrasted with the worst of another; nevertheless, there is more than one grain of truth in their words. The "charming conversationalist" is a man of other days.

The world has lost something in losing the charming conversationalist, and the man who makes light of the loss is kin to him who snaps his fingers at the squandering of time; neither of them has an appreciation of the treasure that has gone. Intimate exchange of thoughts on worth while matters, or, as Pope put it, "the feast of reason and the flow of the soul," concerns itself with the most fascinating science of all—the discovery of man. More than this, the voicing of an opinion is an earnest of that sincerity of feeling which seems to be losing its hold upon us. The inimitable Mr. Blue takes this point well: "If one loves anything, truth, beauty, woman, life, one will speak out. Genuine love cannot endure silence. Genuine love breaks into speech."

Mr. Blue gives us a yet deeper significance of the value of conversation: "It helps some of us to find out what we think," and we may add, "to find out the truth of what we think." Conversation is one of the greatest stimulants and rectifiers of thought. From the days of Socrates and

Zeno of the painted porches to the Mermaid Tavern and beyond, wherever leading minds met and exchanged opinions, there thought in some form or other was rampant; and there, also, we may conjecture, truths were rendered from the crucible and added to the world's inheritance. To realize the value of conversation, one has only to picture Newman, the constant conversationalist, and to call to mind the high percentage of accuracy in his finished philosophical works, though he had not the training of the Schoolmen. On the other hand, where pride or selfishness or haste has choked off conversation, thought is likely to be found cloudy and stagnant as it was in the Oxford of 1800. The men who made the world's great philosophical blunders were frequently those who, dreading to test their opinions on others, allowed them to mature in solitude and to blossom all unchallenged into subjective certainties. Conversation at an early age might have eradicated their false principles, conversation might have shown them errors as they went along, but they spurned it, and their thoughts make treacherous bridges for posterity over the valleys of doubt.

It is hardly necessary to make application to our own case as twentieth century students of philosophy who face a world of changing conditions. We have need of employing all available stimulants of thought. That science has made problems for us may be inferred from a glance at the trend of thought in these present pages; they tell us that philosophy is by no means a closed science with its data discovered to the last detail. But more than this, our very age is hostile to living thought. Life is becoming more and more standardized and the pace of living is accelerating constantly. The exigency of being able to meet our age half-way if we are to be of use has greatly divided our interests and over-burdened us. It is easier than ever to substitute "memory" for "assimilation" in our study of philosophy, and the time-proven but difficult process of "mulling" over fundamental truths is doubly repulsive for us who cannot but be fascinated by the newly-organized and attractive, though less valuable, branches of learning. We see the effects in college life about us; we may attempt a diagnosis of the trouble with American university education today by the observation that too many degrees are given to those who are unable to converse. There is justification for the college professor's application of the psychological epigram "animals do not speak because they have nothing to say" to his students. True conversation implies thought, and a test of the student's ability and achievement might very well be his conversation.

But it is in rectifying our thoughts that conversation has greatest claim to the role of *ancilla philosophiae*. We may conscientiously avoid it only on the supposition that philosophy lends itself so appropriately to classroom presentation that the student cannot fail to gain correct impressions; but the third year philosopher, engaged in the disturbing task of correcting first year concepts, can shout a hearty *nego suppositum* to this. The great value of study clubs and studying in pairs lies precisely here.

THE TREND IN MODERN PSYCHOLOGY

A. PATRICK MADGETT

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ONE need not be a shrewd philosopher to perceive that "psychology" is by no means a univocal term today. In the introduction of his presidential address before the American Psychological Association in 1926, Madison Bentley says: "it is rare to find antithetical positions held upon the very objects and processes which compose the fabric of a science" yet "this is virtually the state of psychology today." We may add that not only with regard to the object of the science is there disagreement, but the aims, the methods, and the terminology are such that one psychologist finds difficulty in understanding another. Referring to psychology's Babel of tongues Bentley puts these words into the mouth of Spinoza: "I converse all languages; behaviorism, mentalism, structuralism, freudism, objectivism, configurism, and even anthroponomy, but I simply don't get it."

With good judgment and keen insight the speaker determines "to avoid prejudice and emotional bias" by substituting in his discussion "the major categories for individual systems and their expounders." He considers "objectivity," "experience," and "subjectivity" a fairly adequate division of these categories of psychology. Under objectivity he includes not only behaviorism but all those psychologies which, for practical or theoretical reasons, confine their study to objects and activities of the physical world. "Experience" embraces primarily the Gestalt psychology, including, however, all forms of psychology which consider the object of their study as a unitary thing, not a complex of individual forces. In the category of "subjectivity" he places psycho-analysis and all other systems which rely on introspection, in the proper sense of the term, as their principal method of study.

Let it not be thought for a moment that even this division has grouped together systems free from internal dissension. There are radical differences within the ranks of those who hold "objectivity" to be the true method of approach to psychology. When Watson's group aggressively asserted that their particular form of behaviorism was the only alternative to Titchener's introspectionalism, a calm but determined voice from England replied: "There is another way — namely *psychology*." At this trenchant remark of McDougall's, Knight Dunlap replied "bravo!" We may safely assert that this is the attitude of the majority of American psychologists. They rigorously adhere to the objective method, the strictly scientific approach to psychology, but they strenuously object to the almost fanatical imposition of a theory which, instead of quickening science, leaves it hidebound. They distinguish clearly between "behavior as a method" and "behaviorism." The former is the scientist's method of approach, used, as far as is humanly possible, without any theoretical bias. The latter is a prejudiced and therefore

unscientific approach which will see no evidence save what supports the theory. If it has resulted in some valuable findings, this is due rather to the fact that it used behavior as a method, than to the fact that it is the particular type of psychology called "behaviorism."

Bentley notices the curious coincidence that in the year 1912 when Watson was nourishing his newly born behaviorism and bemoaning the fact that prior to that year only the conventional psychology of the soul held the field, in Germany the exponents of the new Gestalt psychology complained that nothing but crassest materialism was to be found in psychology, and they consequently insisted on a broader interpretation of that source of so many troubles, the human being. This contradiction in point of view must be encouraging for conservative minds, since they cannot help but conclude that, after all, psychology is not entirely ruled by one radical wing. Whatever may be said of configurationism, the unity insisted on by the Gestalt psychologists is a healthy tendency for the science, implying, as it does, a relation of whole and part, with the emphasis on the whole, as opposed to the objective method which emphasizes rather the parts, the individual acts. This may be a very sketchy idea of Gestalt psychology, but a further explanation is impossible here.

Perhaps the best advertised, certainly the most popular, category is that which includes all approaches to the subject coming under the name "dynamic" psychology. Treating, as it does, of desires, cravings, and inhibitions, it has an appeal which dry scientific measurements can never acquire. The emphasis placed on the abnormal in the various methods of psycho-analysis, and the exaggeration of sex into the all-embracing drive in human nature, have given a vogue to the system originated by Freud which it does not merit. Most psychologists reject psycho-analysis as in no wise deserving the name of science. That it has some value in the treatment of mental ills may be admitted, but this of itself would not merit for it the name of psychology. By making the "person" its primary concern it has, in spite of theoretical bias, opened new fields to the psychologist, and has shown that the biologist's conception of "adjustment" obscures as much as it enlightens the plain facts of life. As in the other categories of psychology we find here, too, that strife which has marked the progress of the science at every step. Freud's first pupil strayed far from his master, and there are psycho-analysts who will have nothing to do with Freud or any of his school.

Our glimpse of present day psychology, inadequate though it be, would not merit even the name of a bird's eye view if we did not take into account the differences between European and American psychologies. Notwith-

standing the rapid strides it has made, the science in this country has not yet acquired a mature outlook. Europe has grown conservative since its first outbursts of enthusiasm. Mechanism and Materialism have been found inadequate to explain the findings of science in the field of psychology. European men of science learned that hasty generalization and over-ardent adherence to a theory must be paid for by the painful disillusionment consequent upon the discovery of contradictions in their cherished theories. Though modern psychology can in no sense be said to have outgrown the stage of youth, yet the term "youth" distinguishes American more aptly than European psychology. How ardently was the eclectic psychologist, William James, hailed, how passionately introspectionism embraced! This phase had scarcely obtained a vogue when behaviorism began to supplant it. The latter, in its turn, has begun to fade out of the scene; and while science is still demanding objectivity, psycho-analysis is fighting for recognition of the human personality. Without belittling the labors of the great number of true and ardent scientists, we must admit that the bizarre finds too easy entrance into the concepts of American psychologists, with no little detriment to the progress of science. Theorizers have done much to obscure the solid work that has been accomplished, creating in the minds of many a deep prejudice against the very name of psychology.

Meanwhile Europe, having passed the boisterous stage, is coming to the realization that science must fit the object, not the object fit the science. Whatever one's philosophy may be, it cannot be imposed ruthlessly on a science that is to deserve the name. We may safely say that there is a growing realization that psychology without a soul is impossible. The American reaction to the soul-concept is that it is not scientific, but it may be retorted that if "scien-

tific" means only what may be measured in terms of physics and chemistry, a psychology which considers the *whole* human being never can be scientific.

Among a group of English psychologists we find a very interesting movement — interesting not merely because certain men have taken up the cause of the much maligned and misunderstood scholastic concept of the soul, but because these men are scientists of the highest repute, whose contributions have commanded the recognition of the whole scientific world. Prominent among these are McDougall, Spearman, and Aveling. McDougall, though he never professed explicitly his acceptance of a vital principle in the strictly scholastic sense, has nevertheless been forced by his findings and by logic to admit an explanation of life impossible without postulating some substantial principle above matter. More explicitly Dr. Aveling in the investigation of the will, and Spearman in his work on intelligence, have come to conclusions which differ in no wise from those of the great scholastics, save that they are supported by a fund of experimental evidence which even the most rigid objectivist cannot spurn. What this movement among the great ones of science will result in we cannot now predict. That it is destined to live we are certain, because it is a search for truth without bias, an investigation willing to accept what it finds, and not find only what it wishes to accept.

Modern psychology, born of physiology, has passed through its childhood and is now a lusty youth. Like every adolescent it errs and errs frequently by excess. Costly mistakes are broadening its horizon, and though there are still many contradictory influences struggling for supremacy, we have every reason to look forward to a happy outcome, resulting in a well-established science.

A QUESTION FOR COSMOLOGISTS

CYRIL O. VOLLERT

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VERY LITTLE has escaped the eagle eyes of the scholastic philosophers. To a modern student with high philosophical ambitions, it might seem that practically all important problems had been investigated by them, and that nothing new remains for the present day metaphysician who would soar to the rarified atmospheres of speculation. And when Goethe, himself a philosopher of considerable acumen, observes that, "Alles Gescheide ist schon gedacht worden, man muss nur versuchen, es noch einmal zu denken," it might seem that the lid had been put on the philosophical cauldron, so that no new ingredients might be added, although further stewing might still improve the flavor of the contents. Therefore the modern Schoolman often satisfies himself with turning out a new commentary on Suarez or St. Thomas, or with writing a text book, rearranging and clarifying matters, but making no really new addition to the science.

But philosophy is not a finished science. In the field

of Cosmology, to take but one example, there is a problem which, as far as is known, has never been philosophically investigated, never been put upon the metaphysical dissecting table. Any philosopher with genius, desiring to explore virgin territory, and with sufficient leisure for serious study, is invited to consider the problem of mass and weight. Mass is an absolute attribute of matter, weight is relative to the presence of other masses. A number of importunate questions at once present themselves to the mind for solution. What is weight? To what predicament does it belong? What is its philosophical definition? In what does its essence consist? It results, let us say, from the attraction of gravity; but precisely what is it that responds to this attraction? You answer that it is mass which responds. But is mass the corporal substance itself, or something distinct from the substance; if it is distinct, is the distinction real or rational? Matter itself has no weight independently of the presence of other

bodies. Weight also follows size, for within a given species individual objects vary in weight according to their size. But a cubic foot of cork has not the same weight as a cubic foot of lead. Therefore, within the same species weight is consequent upon size, but considering many species it is not. In what sense is weight a specific property?

When these problems have been solved there are others to be considered. Whatever be the explanation of mass, is it a necessary property of corporal substance, or is it possible for a body to exist without mass? Obviously, an adequate treatment of such a problem requires more than mere rudimentary notions of physics and chemistry. The modern Schoolman, if he is to be a real philosopher, must be a man in whose education the physical sciences

also have received due attention. Obviously, too, the solution of new problems will not simply run off the point of the pen after a few moments' nibbling of the quill. A poet may be born and not made, but a philosopher must be both born and made—made by years of specialized study upon the completion of the general course.

Those who believe in the perennial life of Scholasticism must believe in its perennial growth, for life implies growth, and growth implies new states of being. The human intellect attained its loftiest limits of perfection in Aristotle and St. Thomas. However, a mountain range does not entirely concentrate itself in its highest peak. It stretches on to an indefinite horizon. By all means scale the known peaks but do not leave unexplored the regions beyond.

THE GREEK MIND AND GOD

WILLIAM J. MILLOR

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GREEK RELIGION, to the average person whose knowledge of it has been gathered from his reading of the classics, is for the most part rather degraded and corrupt, and this opinion is in a certain measure true. Indeed, there is little that is lofty or inspiring in the tales of the gods with their crudities and vices as depicted in Homer and Hesiod. In speaking of Greek religion, however, it must be borne in mind that it consists rather of three religions, or, if you wish, three distinct branches, each widely differing from the other. Only when it is considered in this threefold aspect can the religion of the Hellenes be treated adequately and judged correctly.

First, there was the State religion, consisting of various festivals, processions and ceremonies, which may be likened to our national holidays with their attendant parades and festivities. To some of the Greeks it possessed a real religious significance, while to others it was merely a civic function. Secondly, there was the poetical religion, otherwise called mythology. It is with this form that we are most familiar and from which the bulk of our religious notions of the Greeks are drawn. Thirdly, there was the philosophic religion, to which may be coupled the mysteries with their lofty moral teaching and doctrine of the immortality of the soul. The latter two religions exercised the greatest amount of influence.

Viewed only from the standpoint of mythology it is undeniable that there was much of the coarse and depraved in Greek religion. But taken adequately in all its manifold aspects and given more than a mere surface treatment, it is undoubtedly true that Greek religion in the flourishing epoch of Greek intellectual life with "its cult of visible beauty, its deification of nature, its beautiful and joyous ritual," besides a high tone of morality, was perhaps the most beautiful form of purely natural religion developed by mankind.

It is true that Greek religion was not Triton-born. It did not in its first moments soar to the lofty heights which it afterwards attained. It did not exhibit at the outset those strange lights of feeling and imagination; nor was it immediately wrought into a thing of beauty by the Greek instinctive sense of artistic form. Its origins were attended by many a horror of primitive superstition: its development was a gradual, painful process, racked by numerous growing pains; but in its full maturity it was as perfect as any purely human agency could make it, capable of that sublime prayer which Plato, in the second of the two dialogues named after Alcibiades, puts in the mouth of Socrates, "Give us, O Father Zeus, what is good, whether we pray for it or not; and avert from us the evil, even if we pray for it."¹ What in its perfect faith and self-suppression, could be more Christian?

As has been said the development of Greek religion was attended with many difficulties, and one of its most striking features was the ancient and hereditary feud which it occasioned between the poets and philosophers, the two groups which constituted the religious teaching body of Greece. The causes of the mutual antagonism were the differences expressed on the subject of the Godhead, His attributes and relations with mankind. The poet and philosopher represented two widely divergent streams of development. On the one hand, we have Homer and Hesiod, the two great protagonists of poetry in the feud, reducing the theological discord and chaos prevalent before their time into harmony and order. As Herodotus writes, it was they "who made the Greek theogony, assigned to the gods their appellations, distinguished their provinces and arts, and indicated their various forms."² The works of these two men constituted the orthodox opinion of the Greek. They were studied with great diligence, memorized even, and were quoted to prove a point

(1) Alcibiades, II: 143A.

(2) Herodotus, II: 53.

or to bring home a truth much as the Bible is today. There was much of moral and religious idealism expressed in these works but behind it all there was a dark background of grossness, and running through it was a strong current of license and depravity which could not be overlooked. Besides, the dawning of a deep intellectual life made men dissatisfied with various other elements of Homer and Hesiod.

The poet's barricade was beginning to show weaknesses, weaknesses which undoubtedly existed and which left them wide open for the attack which eventuated.

On the other hand, the philosophers were more and more led by their physical speculations towards a universe in which there was no room left for the Homeric gods, much less, for their vices and crudities. They could not accept the ordinary belief, taught by the poets, that the sun and moon were gods. They stripped them of their divinity and maintained that the sun was nothing but a red hot mass of stone, while the moon was very similar to the earth. The inevitable result was a clash between these two exponents of orthodoxy and dissent. To the poets this was rank atheism, open rebellion, and they proceeded to stigmatize philosophy in the severest terms; and the philosophers retaliated.

In the tenth book of the Republic, Plato cites a number of poetical fragments in which the philosophers are pilloried by the poets. "Philosophy," one of the poets says, "is but a yelping hound howling at her lord," and philosophers are "great only in the vain babblements of fools;" they are "a rabble-rout of wisecracs," "subtle thinkers who are beggars after all," "and," Plato continues, "there are a thousand other signs of enmity between them."³ Strong words these, but they are matched by the savage retorts of the philosophers. Among these latter who repudiated the poetic religion, three are prominent, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Heraclitus. Pythagoras writes that "he saw the soul of Hesiod, bound to a brazen pillar and crying out, together with the soul of Homer suspended from a tree and surrounded by snakes, in return for what they said about the gods."⁴ Heraclitus writes that "Homer is worthy to be cast out of the arena and scourged, aye, and Archilochus with him."⁵ In Xenophanes we find the poets' severest critic voicing an emphatic protest against the anthropomorphism of the Olympian theology in the famous lines preserved to us by Clement. "There is one God, greatest both among the gods and men, resembling mortals neither in form nor in thought." "But mortals think that gods are born, and have dress and voice and form like their own." "But if oxen and lions had hands, or could draw with their hands, and make works of art like man, horses would draw figures of God like horses, oxen figures of God like oxen, giving them bodies like the form which they themselves possessed." "The Ethiopians say their gods are black and flat-nosed; the

Thracians make theirs fair-eyed, and with red hair."⁶ "Homer and Hesiod," writes Xenophanes, "ascribed to the gods everything which is a disgrace and shame among men, theft, adultery and mutual deception."⁷ These and other similar invectives were hurled by philosopher and poet at each other in the *feud* inspired by the *odium theologicum*. In view of the fact that Homer and Hesiod, the former especially, were held in such high regard throughout Greece, and that their works constituted the mental pabulum of the youth from his earliest years, it is not difficult to see why they raised such a storm of fury and evoked the wrath of those seekers after truth. The tales of the gods and their vices could work only harm in the youthful mind. Plato in the second book of the Republic sums up the matter very succinctly. "First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies in high places which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too,—I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and what Cronus did to him. The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and simple persons. The young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous; and that if he chastises his father when he does wrong, in any manner that he likes, he will only be following the example of the gods. Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarreling as dishonorable should anything be said of wars in heaven and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, which are quite untrue—the narrative of Hephaestus binding Hera his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten,—such tales must not be admitted into the state, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For the young man cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal: anything that he receives into his mind at that age is apt to become indelible and unalterable; and therefore the tales which they first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts."⁸ So the two armed camps continued, each developing along independent lines, gradually drawing together, however, under the ennobling influence of Pindar, Aeschylus, and Sophocles, until they finally merge in Euripides, "the philosopher upon the stage." Hereafter philosophy alone continues in the role of religious teacher of Greece. The result of this ancient antagonism was nothing if not beneficial to the Greek religion. Under these steady attacks we find a gradual purification and spiritualization taking place, and the grosser features receding into the background. Slowly the two schools, widely divergent at first, by their mutual action and interaction, draw together, merging at last to form the seed that under the careful nurturing of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, was to burst into the full flowering beauty of the true Greek religion.

(3) Republic, X. 607B.
 (4) Diog., Laert., VIII: 21.
 (5) Diels, Frag., 35, 43.

(6) Diels, Frag., d. Vorsokratiker, I, page 49 ff.
 (7) Diels, Frag., 11, 12.
 (8) Republic, II: 377E ff., Tr. Jowett.

READJUSTING A THEORY

ARTHUR E. GLEASON

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THERE are some difficult problems in Major Logic: Cosmology, too, presents not a few thorny theses. One of the most disputed points occurs in both Critica and Cosmology, namely, the question whether secondary qualities are formally in external objects, or merely causally. Scholastics of the old school hold tenaciously to the theory that these qualities exist in the objects apprehended *tales quales*, that is, just as received by the sensitive faculties. Many modern Schoolmen assert that the special properties which cause our visual, auditory and other sense perceptions are not formally similar to the subjective modalities by which the objects are manifested. In other words, secondary qualities are formally subjective, but have a corresponding causal property in exterior objects.

Adherents of the latter opinion base their proof on certain psycho-physiologic observations and experiments made in a physics laboratory. The following is an interesting example: take two pictures of the same object, for instance, a statue; color one pale yellow and the other pale blue; place them in a stereoscope so that the yellow is before the right eye and the blue before the left. What color will the statue be? green? not at all. One would see in relief a white statue. (This central fusion of complimentary colors is realized, provided the two eyes be of equal force, and the tints appropriately chosen.)

But where is the formal white quality when the observer sees white? A perplexing question for the Formalists. Other arguments urged against advocates of Absolute Realism are the permanence of exterior sensation in the absence of the excitant, such as the light coming from an extinguished star, the time difference between a flash of light and its impression on the eye. Experiments with sound are likewise adduced.

Dr. Necchi writing in the *Rivista de Filosofia Neo-Scholastica* says that "it suffices to have once put foot in a laboratory for experimental psychology, or simply to have some knowledge of the physiology of sense organs to understand how difficult, not to say useless, it is to try to escape evidence by imposing an objective interpretation on experiments that, in a clear and precise manner, say the contrary."¹ With experimental knowledge at hand, why, then, do Formalists, or Integral Perceptionists as they are sometimes called, cling to the belief that secondary qualities exist in objects just as they are perceived? Because of a fear and because of a theory. They contend that the novelty of secondary qualities existing only causally in the objects is dangerously near Idealism, pure Subjectivism or Kantianism. Father de Sinety allays their alarms in his satisfying solutions to objections given at the end of a

lengthy article *Connaissance Sensible des Qualités Secondaire*.² The other reason for not adopting the simple explanations offered by scientists is because, the Formalists say, if visual and auditory sensations are real sense cognitions, the formal objects, i. e., color and sound, must exist even as we know them. Asked to prove the assertion they reply: "Every cognition supposes an assimilation between the knowing subject and the object known. The object, therefore, is apprehended as it is in itself." This object, they add, does not come to us, but there is an exact image, a *species impressa*, unknown but intentionally like the object. This *species* informs the cognoscitive faculty which is thereby *assimilated* to the object in the order of cognition.

A clever evasion, that. Quite true the object must act upon the senses and determine them to cognition, but this action of the object on the subject, does it *formally* assimilate the subject to the object? That is precisely the point in question.

Monsignor Farges, in the fifth volume of his *Etudes Philosophiques* bases his argumentation for formal assimilation on two principles generally accepted in scholastic philosophy:³

1. Actio agentis est in patiente.

2. Omne agens producit aliquid sibi simile,

or as St. Thomas puts the axiom, "De natura agentis est ut agens agat sibi simile."⁴

In sense cognition the object acts on the subject, and has its action in the knowing subject. But this action tends to assimilate the subject to the object. Therefore sense cognition supposes this assimilation.

A neat demonstration but it fails to solve the difficulty because the question at once arises, is the assimilation between subject and object formal?

De Backer in his text on Cosmology expresses very clearly the need of a formal assimilation. "Inter actum cognoscitivum repraesentative inspectum et objectum ad quod actus terminatur *formalis* similitudo intercedat oportet: cognitio enim consistit in *assimilatione* subjecti cognoscentis cum proprio cognitionis objecto. . . . Ergo nisi genuinus conceptus cognitionis penitus corrumpatur, atque adea idealismo via sternatur, dicendum est sensibilia propria non meros motus locales sed qualitates esse proprie tales."

Here is the theory that needs changing. "What," exclaim the Perceptionists, "abandon the theory of cognition by assimilation of Subject to Object? Doesn't that mean a rupture with tradition in a capital point?" Suarez called this theory "dogma et principium in philosophia et theologia."⁵ Fr. Paul Geny, late professor of Philosophy at the

(1) *Rivista de Filosofia Neo-Scholastica*, Feb., 1913.

(2) *Revue des Questions Scientifiques*, pp. 558 sq.

(3) *Etudes Philosophiques*, pp. 20 et seq.

(4) *Contra Gent.*, I., I. c. 29.

(5) Suarez, *De Angelis*, lib. 2, c. 3.

Gregorian, in his volume *Critica* said: "Admittere autem apprehensionem aliquam attingere objectum aliter ac est, est gravissimo vulnere afficere notionem illam naturalem cognitionis."⁶ Liberatore speaking of the theory of interpretation said "est autem pernicioiosa, quia aliquid simile formis kantianis tribuit. ac proinde transcendentali idealismo aperit viam."⁷ To admit that some objects of sense are not formally as we experience them, isn't that seriously compromising the very definition of truth?

The re-adjustment, however, is not so tragic. When facts show that there is no formal resemblance between some sensations and their objects the Moderate Realist renounces the theory of assimilation as absolute in all cognition. The beautiful unity of the system is lost, but the truth seems nearer. Moreover, the whole theory of cogni-

tion is not thrown overboard, but in lieu of a *species impressa* formally like the object, we can use—more in harmony with knowledge acquired in Physics and Physiology—the terms "sensory determinant." This active determinant is not formally but proportionally similar to the sensation produced, and the principle "omne agens agit sibi simile" is understood "omnis causa agit secundam suam naturam."

Lest this idea of changing somewhat a time-honored theory of the Schools seem revolutionary, I quote the words of that learned neo-Thomist, Cardinal Mercier. "We are," he writes in his *Psychologie*, "in an epoch of transition between a traditional interpretation of sensitive facts, based largely on the results of common experience, and a new interpretation of which every one has need."⁸

(6) Geny, *Critica*, p. 231.

(7) Liberatore, v. I. p. 128.

(8) Mercier, *Psychologie*, p. 163.

BOOK REVIEWS

DUNS SCOTUS

Duns Scotus, by C. R. S. Harris, D. Phil. (Oxon.), Ph.D. (Princeton), 2 Vols., Oxford University Press, \$15.00.

A SHORT time ago a band of non-Catholic Oxford students, it was reported, sought admission to the Third Order of St. Francis. About the same time an Oxford professor was dismayed to find his students neglecting Tennyson for Francis Thompson. And now an Oxford graduate ransacks medieval philosophy in an effort to elevate a Franciscan friar, Duns Scotus, to the throne long occupied by St. Thomas. Strange trinity of events, not unrelated but conspiring to evidence that general approach to Catholic life and interests that has grown steadily for more than a quarter of a century. Chesterton's hint of a Catholic renaissance, in his open letter to James Douglas, may be a genuine prophecy.

Dr. C. S. R. Harris, author of these volumes on the philosophical merits of Scotus, was born in 1896, studied at Oxford and Princeton Universities, and received the doctorate in philosophy from each, submitting parts of the present work as his theses. He aims to present the teaching of Scotus "as the culminating point of Latin Scholasticism" and to show that "the main currents of medieval thought Augustinianism, Aristotelianism, Nominalism, and Realism find a meeting place in his system, which represents the richest and most mature development of the philosophical tradition of the middle ages."

Dr. Harris' volumes are the triumph of failure, for he fails to establish his main point, yet succeeds beyond expectation in portraying for us the great intellectual drama of the greatest of centuries, with a host of powerful thinkers grouped around the redoubtable Subtle Doctor. Starting with the meagre biographical details at present available concerning Scotus, the author presents in Volume I an account of the relations between faith and reason in that

age of faith, shows their relation in the writings of Scotus, gives exhaustive comparisons of the doctrine of Scotus to that of the great thinkers on whom he built, and reveals in detail the difference between Scotus and St. Thomas. In Volume II, he gives a minute account of the Subtle Doctor's more important theories, again correlating him with his predecessors and contemporaries and incorporating into his account the views of the leading Scotian scholars. All this is accomplished through overwhelming erudition, a fine zest for the subject, and a keen penetration, though it must be confessed that in several instances he strays from a correct understanding of the questions involved, and moreover, adopts a viewpoint towards Scholasticism which inevitably depreciates the value of his contribution.

Dr. Harris' unusual thesis falls down partly because of a difficulty centering around *De Rerum Principio* and partly because of an underestimation of an important achievement of St. Thomas. The author builds his case chiefly on the work above mentioned, yet has to confess that the modern authorities on the subject doubt or reject its authenticity. Nor is his case much stronger if he succeeds in vindicating it as Scotistic. For, in so doing, he has to put it down as a very early work and implicitly admits that the later writings show a marked divergence from its doctrine. Thus we find Scotus abandoning the very views on which the author founds his claim to pre-eminence.

Also he admits, though Fr. Minges denies it, that Scotus never succeeded in rounding out his system as a complete whole. His work was largely piece-meal, and in no small part negative. Now this is a serious deficiency in a candidate for all-scholastic honors, for it is not the least of St. Thomas' claims to supremacy that he succeeded precisely in completing and establishing a system. And this is a criterion we apply quite generally in appraising philosophers. The only genuine claim of Kant to greatness

is that he developed a complete system, faulty as it is. We may argue that had Scotus not died at so young an age he would have done so. But in point of fact he did not; and mute Miltons do not become laureates.

However, though the thesis must be dismissed as not proved, the author has contributed a valuable synthetic commentary on the thought of the time, and has portrayed to advantage the breadth and subtlety, the originality and independence of his hero. He has shown himself familiar with the difficult terminology of that period and rather appreciative of the problems raised. Among many examples of the originality of Scotus he cites his rejection of the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of *materia prima* as pure indetermination metaphysically incapable of separate existence; his new theory of the principle of individuation; his new approach to the problem of evil; his invention of the famous *distinctio formalis a parte rei*. Again he distinguishes clearly between the voluntarism of Scotus and the intellectualism of St. Thomas, and crushes the slander that this medievalist was a pre-Kantian. Scotistic voluntarism, he capably demonstrates, bears only the most superficial resemblance to the arrogance of the Practical Reason.

Dr. Harris errs, however, in suggesting that the learned Franciscan conceived the uniformity of nature in the modern absolute sense, and that he was, in his social and political doctrine, the forerunner of Rousseau and Marx. And finally, the young doctor's viewpoint leads him into error. He believes, or hints, that the dogmas of faith and the truths of Scholasticism were mutually exclusive; that when an apparent contradiction arose, the cards were always stacked against human reason. His conception of the scholastic and biblical Deity is a caricature; he finds an intrinsic contradiction in the notion of an omnipotent and all-good God. He misses the real significance of St. Anselm's "*Credo ut intellegam.*" The attempt to define the boundaries of philosophy and theology is for him the first step toward the overthrow of Scholasticism. And he seems (II, 146 and II, 51) to subscribe to the relativity and mutability of truth. These numerous misconceptions are regrettable; the author's success in spite of them is surprising.

P. V. K.

ST. THOMAS

The Summa Contra Gentiles of St. Thomas Aquinas, Book III, Part I, a Literal Translation by the English Dominican Fathers, New York: Benziger Bros., 1928, \$4.

AN ARDENT philosopher, conversing once with the present reviewer, lamented that so little of our knowledge of scholastic philosophy is drawn from intimate acquaintance with the works of the masters. He even went so far as to suggest that the *Summae* of St. Thomas be used as our texts, for their use would be calculated to economize time, improve our methods, and intensify reflection and interest. Few of us could accept that point of view entirely. But THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is thoroughly in sympathy with the propaganda of professors and scholastic authors generally that a direct familiarity with the

works of the Angelic Doctor is the greatest of the many boons which philosophy is calculated to give its followers. The *Summae* of St. Thomas which are being translated by the English Dominicans and so handsomely printed by Benziger Brothers open up these great quarries of thought both to us who are by profession scholastic philosophers and to all non-scholastic philosophers who sincerely seek authoritative information about Scholasticism.

What should particularly interest us all in this series of translations is their immediate service to graduate students in scholastic philosophy. There was a golden age when a copy of St. Thomas was the indispensable *vade mecum* of all philosophers. Shall we come to a new golden age when every graduate student of Scholasticism must be required to read his Aquinas at least in English? Is not such a requirement much more practicable than a demand for a knowledge of foreign languages? At any rate, if we do reach that happy standard, the English edition here presented to us is an ideal volume for the purpose.

As is well known, this third book of the *Contra Gentiles* deals with God as the final end of creation. To be complete, it must therefore include the numerous other propositions which go to establish that thesis. So we have crisp discussions of final cause, of evil and its relations to final cause, of beatitude and its essence, of the nature of knowledge of God in the state of beatitude, of God's conservation and providence and omnipresence and concurrence in all grades of being in order that all being may reach God, its final goal. In other words, this book deals with the broad ethical foundations of Scholasticism. It is interesting to see the mind of Aquinas focussing so many separate propositions of our philosophy around this general notion of God, the Final End of creation, Who rules and directs all to this End.

B. J. W.

METAPHYSICS

Scholastic Metaphysics by Rev. John F. McCormick, S. J., Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1928.

SCHOLASTIC METAPHYSICS presents philosophy to the beginner in a most attractive manner. The author departs from the formal theses of the Latin texts and the "customary division of the subject into Ontology, Cosmology, etc." He has so well chosen and correlated the fundamental thoughts of metaphysics that the book forcefully projects the relationship between leading ideas. This feature is particularly gratifying because it is an element in philosophy-building which is sometimes forgotten. For too comprehensive treatment of a very small portion of the whole isolates the part from the main subject; and undue stress upon the relations of pre-notes, proofs and objections within the same thesis tends to obscure the parallel relations between thesis and thesis, proof and proof.

Scholastic Metaphysics (if the erudite title does not frighten the beginner) will do much to stimulate the growing interest in this really fascinating subject. It is an adaptation of Scholasticism to the American mind; and we believe that the American mind is both eager and capable of going beyond the merely physical and external,

provided that it can find some one to guide it step by step in an organized way. This book is such a guide, for its chief concern is positive doctrine, not fine-spun speculation.

The chapters are divided into short, clear paragraphs, each of which has its topic headed in heavy type so that one can readily page references and easily review the essential relationships. A splendid summary concludes each chapter, together with problems and suggestions for further study and a topical bibliography.

The treatises on Causes, on Matter and Form and the Organism, and on Matter and Form and Human Life are especially noteworthy.

This work of 253 pages in a neat and convenient volume forms Part 1 of a work which approaches our ideal of a text capable of fostering and sustaining organized thought. It is not only a book for the young philosopher, but it is just the thing for those men about us who feel a need of a firmer knowledge upon which to build for the future.

P. J. M.

PSYCHOLOGY

Studies in the Psychology of the Mystics by Rev. Joseph Maréchal, S. J., Benziger Bros.

FATHER JOSEPH MARECHAL, S. J., learned Professor of Psychology at Louvain University once wrote in a letter: 'Mysticism has always attracted me as being the completion and crowning of metaphysics and psychology. It is from below, as a philosopher and scientist, that I wished to study it ' The present volume, translated from the French by Algar Thorold, contains his most mature thought. It is a series of six penetrating essays written at different times for various publications in France and Belgium.

The first essay, "Empirical Science and Religious Psychology" examines a fundamental problem of method. 'Should religious psychology be constituted, yes or no, on the type, by the methods and in conformity with the general postulates of the positive science?' Some, non-believers in general, attribute a presumption of competence to the 'scientific prejudice;' others, of whom Fr. Maréchal is one, are more impressed with the weakness of that presumption. It will even seem to them that the possibilities thrown open by metaphysics and the probabilities suggested by theology, without peremptorily establishing the incompetence of scientific methods, destroy at least the presumption of their competence. This is the 'Catholic prejudice.' The essay is a keen discussion of the above question from these two points of view.

The second essay discusses the "Feeling of Presence in Mystics and Non-Mystics." James and Delacroix have already treated this point. Fr. Maréchal claims 'from a preliminary examination of profane documents alone, to suggest solutions . . . which will enable the laws and analogies of psychology to be accepted in a strictly mystical connection.' He does not claim, however, to provide a definitive solution of this little problem.

"Some Distinctive Features of Christian Mysticism" considers mystic phenomena from the standpoint of the

empiricist and clinical investigator. To define the 'essence' of Christian mysticism is an ontological problem, for science does not go beyond 'phenomena.' Hence, Fr. Maréchal is mindful of the moment when he must shift his position and write as a philosopher and theologian.

The doctrine of Bryn Mawr's distinguished professor is analyzed and his errors pointed out in "Professor Leuba as a Psychologist of Mysticism." "The Problem of Mystical Grace in Islam" takes up the remarkable mysticism of al-Hallaj and indicates some principles by which his case and that of other Orientals might be solved. The final essay makes enlightening comparisons between different mysticisms of both the East and the West. The essential points of Catholic mysticism are brought out in all their simplicity and sublimity.

Religious phenomena in general and mystical phenomena in particular are widely studied in America today by psychologists, of whom very many are unbelievers. Wrong notions of Catholic mysticism abound. These scholarly essays will help much towards clarifying ideas and establishing sane views on this obscure subject. They show that Fr. Maréchal has done some real sound thinking. It is to be hoped that more Catholic psychologists in this country will undertake a thorough study of mysticism and general religious psychology, which some 25 years ago originated in America.

A. C. K.

OTHER WORKS

Catholic Evidence Training Outlines, Compiled by Maisie Ward, Second Edition, New York: Benziger Bros., \$1.50.

This work is the result of long experience of those who have successfully presented Catholic Apologetics to non-Catholic audiences in England. In the foreword, Francis Cardinal Bourne, Archbishop of Westminster recommends the volume to all Catholics inasmuch as they will find therein Catholic Philosophy and Theology set forth "in a manner adapted to the capacity of the average man of the present day."

The book will provide earnest Catholics with a forceful presentation of their faith, and the priest of the convert class with an aid in the preparation of his lectures. This second edition contains a new section of special interest to schools of philosophy,—several lectures on natural religion, the existence, nature, and attributes of God, the soul, and the problem of evil. The book is popular with the instructors of the "Inquiry Forum" of St. Louis University.

S. E.

Facing Life, by Raoul Plus, S. J., Translated from the French: Benziger Bros., 1928, \$1.50.

With Saints and Sages. Edited by F. X. Lasance: Benziger Bros. 1928, \$4.75 and \$6.00.

These two brief volumes represent further attempts upon the part of deservedly popular writers to put the Christian philosophy of life within the reach of the general reader. The first is a series of a conferences by the well-

known French writer. It is designed primarily for young women and expounds in a very readable fashion, interspersed with much anecdote, the Catholic view upon the duties of various states of life and the bases of what the author likes to call 'intelligent piety.' Father Lasance's work is a selection of thoughts on the Christian ideal ranging from those of St. Augustine down through the Dominican saints, St. Ignatius Loyola, St. Francis de Sales, to Kenelm Digby and even contemporary writers.

These works, on subjects which always merit further penetration, should please the Catholic reader. B. W. D.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Community School Visitor, Sister Mary Salome, Milwaukee, Bruce, \$1.20.

The Philosophy of Spinoza, Richard McKeon, New York, Longmans, \$5.00.

Whither Mankind, Edited by C. A. Beard, Longmans, \$3.

The New Testament Witness to St. Peter, New York, Benziger, \$1.75.

Christ and the Priest, Middleton, Benziger, \$1.75.

God Infinite and Reason, W. J. Brosnan, S. J., New York, American Press.

News and Activities

ON NOVEMBER 20th, His Holiness graciously accorded an audience to Rev. Father Gianfranceschi Rector of the Gregorian University, and a group of his students from the University. The young men, mostly newcomers or foreign students, were greatly encouraged by the manner in which the Holy Father complimented the valuable work done by the University, and in particular the loyalty and devotion of its faculty members, past and present, to the Holy See. After these compliments to the achievements of the institution in the fields of philosophy and theology, the Pope imparted to the scholastics all the blessings which he was capable of giving for all the intentions which they might have 'in their minds and hearts.'

One of those present from the Missouri Province, saw to it that THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN was included in his intentions, so this journal is thus in some small fashion at least favored with the blessing of the Father of Christendom.

The students of L'Immaculée-Conception, Montreal, are fortunate in securing lectures on various subjects of philosophical interest. On December 23rd, Mr. Daniel O'Grady, a Professor of Philosophy of the University of Notre Dame, addressed them on the topic, "Behold the Behaviorist." During the next month, they will have the pleasure of listening to the renowned Jacques Maritain of France. Last year, M. Etienne Gilson of the University of Paris appeared before the students.

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN desires to congratulate the philosophic honor society of Marquette University, The Aristotelians, on the appearance of their magazine, The Stagirite. This latest entry into the field of philosoph-

ic journals will appear quarterly under the guidance of Mr. John O. Riedl as Managing Editor. The present issue contains as the first of its four papers *The Question of Providence in Pagan and Christian Philosophy*, by Clare C. Quirk, an essay evidencing wide knowledge and marked discrimination.

We regret to record the recent death of Dr. Thomas Chrowder Chamberlin, Professor-emeritus of Geology, University of Chicago, and past-president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, who was co-author with Dr. F. R. Moulton of the Chamberlin-Moulton theory of the origin of the solar system.

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN desires to thank those who expressed their congratulations on its new format. The annual reorganization of the staff will take place before the appearance of the March issue. Mr. Bernard W. Dempsey will assume the position of editor.

The statement of Dr. H. E. Barnes before the convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Science during the holidays, calling for a new concept of God, was quickly answered by Dr. Henry Fairfield Osborne, President of the Association, and by Cardinal Hayes. However, the issue of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch for January 6th contained as a feature article, the complete address of Dr. Barnes, but no complete reply. It is to be inferred that many other metropolitan newspapers followed the lead of the Post-Dispatch. One of the professors of St. Louis University has in preparation an answer to Dr. Barnes, and it is to be hoped that like work is going forward wherever the complete address appeared. Such statements made by authorities and allowed to go unanswered must prove disturbing to Catholics in general.

Two of the Marquette Monographs on Education soon to appear are worthy of note by philosophers. They are: *The Philosophy of Teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas*, including a translation of the *De Magistro*, (cf. THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, May, 1928) and *The Training of the Will*, by Johann Lindworsky, S. J., in English translation.

Papers to be read at the January meetings of the Philosophers' Academy include: *Human Instincts*, J. E. Flanagan; *Non-scholastic Vitalists*, C. J. Ryan; *Emerson the Father of American Pantheism*, J. P. Donnelly; *The Trend Toward Humanitarianism*, J. M. Tainter.

CONCERNING MANUSCRIPTS

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is happy to receive any manuscripts which students of other scholasticates are kind enough to prepare and send. The work of preparing papers for the printer will be greatly lightened if contributors will use double space with generous margins in typing their work. Footnotes properly numbered should be included in the body of the manuscript directly below the line to which they refer, and enclosed between two parallel lines to differentiate them from the reading matter of the article. A note of approbation from the professor of the subject treated in the scholasticate from which the paper comes, is very desirable.